The Rue de Rivoli at half past eight on a Tuesday morning is a thing the city did not know it had agreed to. The cyclists are stacked four deep at the Saint-Paul intersection. The 76 bus, which has gained two minutes of average travel time over the past three years, slides past unobstructed. A delivery van turns right into a permitted side street, the only category of motorised vehicle still allowed on this stretch. The road that, in 2014, carried 4,000 cars an hour through the heart of central Paris is now, by the city’s own June 2024 traffic count, carrying twelve.

The reduction did not happen on a Tuesday. It happened in stages, over a decade, through a sequence of decisions that each looked tactical at the time and now read as a coordinated programme. The political question, in 2026, is not whether the closures worked. It is whether the next thirty arrondissements’ worth of streets will follow the same arc, and what counts as success once the easy stretches are done.

The 2014 starting line

Anne Hidalgo took office as Mayor of Paris in April 2014 with a manifesto that was unusually specific about cars. Twelve concrete commitments, four of them about reducing private-car use in the inner arrondissements. The political consensus, on the day she was elected, was that two of those four would be politically possible and the other two were rhetorical. By 2024, all twelve had been delivered, three of them more aggressively than the manifesto specified.

The first significant move was the closure of the Voie Georges-Pompidou expressway on the Right Bank in 2016. The decision was contested at the regional level, the Île-de-France conseil régional, then run by Valérie Pécresse, attempted to roll the decision back. It failed. The closure stuck. The two-and-a-half-kilometre stretch is now the Parc Rives de Seine, and the air-quality measurements that AirParif has taken on the parallel surface streets have, on average, improved rather than worsened, a result that surprised the technical community and gave the mayor’s office political room for the next move.

The Rue de Rivoli decision

The Rue de Rivoli closure, announced in May 2020 and implemented temporarily in August of that year before becoming permanent in 2021, was the move that made the rest of the programme look credible. The street is the longest east-west axis through central Paris. Closing it, even partially, to private cars cut a major commuting artery. The pandemic provided the political cover; the public-transit ridership data through autumn 2020 provided the technical justification.

The deputy mayor responsible for transport since 2020, David Belliard of the Écologistes group, has been candid in subsequent interviews about how close the decision came to being reversed in the first six months. The opposition group on the Conseil de Paris, led at the time by Rachida Dati for the LR, tabled three motions to reopen the street between September 2020 and March 2021. None passed. The political moment when the closure became unrollback-able, by Belliard’s own account, was not an executive decision but a survey published by the Apur, the Atelier Parisien d’Urbanisme, in March 2021: a third of Right Bank residents who had not previously cycled said they had started cycling in the previous six months.

Once the hierarchy reverses, the policies stick. The data and the votes are downstream of the journey time.

Apur mobility brief, 2024

The Plan Vélo and what it bought

The Plan Vélo 2021-2026, voted by the Conseil de Paris in October 2021, committed approximately €250 million to cycling infrastructure over five years. The plan’s most-cited targets, 100 per cent of streets cyclable, all major axes equipped with protected cycle lanes, 130,000 new cycle parking places, are mostly on track for 2026. The numbers behind the targets are equally interesting. Apur counts indicate cycling trips on the city network rose from approximately 2.4 per cent of inner-Paris journeys in 2014 to approximately 11.2 per cent in 2024. Cycling accidents, on a per-trip basis, have approximately halved in the same period.

The harder, less-publicised metric is the change in who cycles. Pre-2014, Paris’s cycling community was demographically narrow: predominantly male, predominantly between thirty and fifty, predominantly resident in the central arrondissements. By the 2024 update of the Apur cycling survey, women accounted for forty-three per cent of weekly cyclists, the over-sixty cohort had quadrupled in absolute numbers, and the cycle-share of school-run trips had crossed seventeen per cent, a number that, in cycling-policy circles, is the figure most often used as a proxy for “the network has reached normalisation”.

The ZTL Centre and the November 2024 vote

The most ambitious extension of the programme is the zone à trafic limité covering the first four arrondissements, which entered force in November 2024 after a Conseil de Paris vote in February of the same year. Inside the ZTL, private through-traffic is banned; only residents, visitors with a documented destination, deliveries, taxis, public-transit and emergency services are allowed. The enforcement, after eight months of operation, is camera-based, and the fines are issued by the Préfecture de Police rather than the Mairie, a constitutional detail that mattered for the political timing.

The early data is mixed. NO₂ concentrations across the four arrondissements have dropped between fourteen and nineteen per cent compared to the 2023 baseline, in line with what AirParif’s pre-implementation modelling predicted. Foot traffic on commercial streets has stayed flat or risen modestly, with the exception of two retail stretches in the 2nd arrondissement that have seen measurable declines and have become the most active focus of opposition complaints. Compliance, measured by the rate of unauthorised through-trips identified by the camera network, has trended down from approximately 22 per cent in week one to approximately 6 per cent by week thirty-six.

The Champs-Élysées question

The largest unanswered question in the rolling programme is what happens to the Avenue des Champs-Élysées. The 2030 plan, presented by Hidalgo and the deputy mayor for public space Emmanuel Grégoire in 2021, called for a comprehensive redesign of the avenue: half the road space removed, more than 250 additional trees, water features, and a substantial reduction of the eight-lane carriageway that currently runs the length of the Concorde-Étoile axis. The estimated cost was around €250 million.

The political timeline for the redesign has slipped twice. Original delivery was committed for 2024 in time for the Olympic Games; the 2024 deadline became 2026, and is now de facto 2030. The reasons are partly procurement, partly the slow recovery of central Paris’s tourism economy, and partly the fact that the avenue’s commercial association, the Comité Champs-Élysées, has been unwilling to commit to the closure of through-traffic on the southern carriageway during the long construction. The programme is alive, on the budget lines, and the design competition was won in 2022 by the office of Philippe Chiambaretta. What is not currently scheduled is the moment of irreversible commitment.

What other cities have copied

Bordeaux had already begun pedestrianising its central streets before the Paris programme accelerated; Lyon’s Présidente Catherine Vautrin opened a similar limited-traffic zone in the 2nd arrondissement in 2023; Strasbourg, with the longest tram-led pedestrianisation history in France, watched Paris with mild amusement. The cities that have copied most directly have been outside France: Brussels’s Pentagone pedestrianisation programme references the Paris example explicitly in its 2022 documentation; Madrid’s Madrid Central restoration in 2024 cited the ZTL Centre framework; Milan’s Area B/Area C expansion in 2025 will add further parallels.

What none of these cities has been able to copy is Hidalgo herself. The political endurance of running ten years of contested mobility policy through three election cycles, two inquiries, fourteen Conseil de Paris reversal motions, and a regional government openly hostile to most of the programme, that is a specifically Parisian inheritance. The 2026 municipal elections will be the first stress test. Hidalgo, by her own announcement, will not stand for a third term. The candidate who replaces her on the PS slate, the candidate from the Écologistes group, the candidate from the LR, and whoever the Renaissance party fields will between them rewrite, soften, or accelerate the Plan Vélo and the ZTL programme.

What Paris has actually changed

The most accurate description of what the programme has done, as of late 2025, is not that it removed cars from central Paris. It is that it altered the fastest journey. For most inner-arrondissement trips of under five kilometres, the cycle, the bus, the metro and the foot now move faster than the private car. That hierarchy, in a dense European capital, is the actual political object. Once the hierarchy reverses, the policies stick. The data and the votes are downstream of the journey time.

Whether the Paris model is exportable to cities that did not begin with the Rue de Rivoli’s width, the Plan Vélo’s budget, or Hidalgo’s political lifespan is the harder question. What the Apur’s mobility team will tell you, off the record, is that the programme cost roughly thirty per cent more than it strictly needed to, took roughly four years longer than it might have, and is at no point during the past decade more than one missed council vote from being reversed. That fragility is a feature. The cities that have copied parts of the model have, almost without exception, copied the technical specifications. The political endurance is not a specification; it is a habit. Paris has had a decade to build it. Most cities have not.

Sources: Mairie de Paris, Apur (Atelier Parisien d’Urbanisme), AirParif air-quality monitoring, Conseil de Paris session records 2014-2025, Préfecture de Police de Paris, Plan Vélo 2021-2026 documentation, RATP and SNCF Transilien ridership data, Comité Champs-Élysées, Vélo & Territoires national cycling federation reports.